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Abstract 
 
The primary objective of infrastructure pricing in normative economics and policy discussions is 
economic efficiency This focus has led to the proposal that charges for infrastructure use should be based 
on all internal and external marginal costs associated with the use of infrastructure services. Distributional 
considerations, of the “fairness” of infrastructure pricing often played a supplementary role to help the 
acceptance of infrastructure charging. 
This paper sets out a simple framework for a quasi-market for infrastructure services with the 
perspective of simultaneously determining efficient prices and levels of infrastructure investment. It is 
shown that, depending on the intensity of infrastructure use, revenues generated by efficient prices do not 
in all cases cover the full costs of the services. Efficient cost recovery requires an additional fixed charge. 
Such a combination of a fixed charge and an efficient price per unit of service implies a distributional 
conflict if users differ substantially in their demand for infrastructure services. It is shown that methods to 
allocate fixed costs resolve this conflict applying standard norms of distributional justice and being 
compatible with a bargaining equilibrium among heterogeneous infrastructure users. 
 
Keywords: Infrastructure pricing; Infrastructure investment; Cost recovery; Fairness. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper discusses the conflict between allocative efficiency and “fairness” that 
arises from an optimal decentralized provision of infrastructure services. Pricing of 
infrastructure services and the notion of “fairness” is narrower than in current policy 
discussions (Commission of the European Communities, 1998). The paper starts out by 
focussing on the problem of efficiently providing infrastructure services for high levels 
of congestion and a homogeneous population of prospective users (Starrett, 1988, for 
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example). It will be shown that with high levels of congestion, optimal prices for 
infrastructure services cover full costs. Congestion costs are represented as a disutility 
due to crowding. This contrasts with the standard literature on pricing and infrastructure 
investment, where congestion costs are included in a generalised cost function, making 
strong assumptions about its functional form (Mohring and Harwitz, 1962; Small, 1992; 
see the review in Verhoef, forthcoming). In contrast, with no or relatively low levels of 
congestion, optimal prices imply deficits in the provision of these services. 
To pin down ideas on fairness, prominent principles of fairness will be discussed (for 
a review, see Moulin, 2003). One of these principles, the reward principle, will be 
argued to be the most important fairness principle in the discussion of the distributional 
effects of pricing rules. Applying the fairness notion of the reward principle, no conflict 
of compatibility between allocative efficiency and distributive justice arises in the 
benchmark case with strong congestion and optimal marginal cost prices. A genuine 
distributional conflict results in the cases of relatively low levels of congestion, with the 
implication of the non-coverage of fixed costs by the revenues from efficient prices, and 
heterogeneous users with respect to their demands for infrastructure services. 
The paper concludes with a characterization of the allocation of fixed costs that 
satisfies widely supported axioms of fairness (Mirman and Taubman, 1982), and which 
can be interpreted as the outcome of an n-person cooperative bargaining game 
(Harsanyi, 1979) as well as an application of the Rawlsian theory of justice (Rawls, 
1988). 
 
2. The basic framework 
 
In accordance with the public finance characterization of transport infrastructure 
goods, we focus on the fact that transport infrastructure in general and highways in 
particular have high fixed costs and relatively low costs that vary with the level of 
usage. Moreover, due to the indivisibility of infrastructure goods there is an under-
utilization of the good and crowding at high levels of usage. Considering construction, 
maintenance and congestion costs due to crowding, the collection of users is confronted 
with decreasing average costs for low levels of usage due to the dominance of the fixed 
costs and with increasing costs per user for high levels of usage due to the dominance of 
the congestion costs. Due to the invisibility there is also a very low elasticity of 
substitution with other infrastructure objects, if this exists at all. These characteristics 
imply that private markets do not in general lead to optimal allocations, or that 
government interventions have the potential to lead to a higher degree of welfare for the 
collective of users. In implementing reforms of the provision of transport infrastructure 
services, income distribution effects seem to have had at least as strong a resonance 
politically as arguments concerning the efficiency of the transport sector. One of the 
reasons why infrastructure pricing is perceived to be unjust lies in the disconnection 
between the provision of services and payment brought about by tax financing. Some of 
the users seem to have interpreted this as receiving a free good. 
To set out the analytical framework for the analysis of the distribution effects of 
highway pricing, we start with a very simple framework where income distribution is 
not an issue. A population of n users all have the same preferences for the consumption 
of infrastructure services and a private consumption good. 
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We start by defining the following variables: 
 
c ≡ consumption good (actual consumption minus initial endowment), the consumption 
good is perfectly divisible 
 
η ≡ individual use of the transport infrastructure good 
 
n ≡ number of individuals, treated as a continuous variable 
 
U ≡ utility of individual (all equal) 
 
Γ ≡ costs of infrastructure provision 
 
n*η ≡ G, total use of the public consumption good 
 
The identity of the preferences is expressed by assuming that all users have the same 
utility function. 
We disregard the production sector: All individuals are equipped with a certain 
amount of consumption goods and decide on how much of private consumption they 
would like to give up for using the infrastructure. This disregard of the production 
sector for the private good means that we implicitly assume that the private sector is 
perfectly competitive.1 Focussing on the allocation aspects in this section, all 
individuals are equal in terms of the initial endowment with the private consumption 
good c . 
 
 
2.1 Utility 
 
Given that individuals are assumed to be homogeneous, all have the same utility 
function: 
 ( ) ( )
0,0,0
,,,,
≤≥≥
==
Gc UUU
GcUncUU
η
ηηη
 (1) 
 
All consumers, or the representative consumer, have binary preference orderings 
which are complete, transitive and continuous. The utility function is then a continuous, 
real-value function. It increases digressively with the private consumption good, and 
with the individual use of infrastructure, which might be the number of trips or the 
number of kilometres travelled. G denotes the total use of the infrastructure. The higher 
the total use the more individuals suffer from congestion costs. That is, an increase of G 
reduces utility. The second row of 1 denotes first derivatives of the utility function. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Otherwise the pricing of infrastructure services might have to consider second best pricing, taking 
account of the degree of monopoly in the private sector. 
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2.2 Costs 
 
Costs of the facility increase with its total use, the “capacity”. We assume that costs 
increase with the capacity. At this stage it is not necessary to restrict admissible forms 
of the function, i.e. decreasing, constant or increasing average costs. 
 ( ) ( )
0≥Γ
Γ=Γ=Γ
G
Gnη
 (2) 
 
3. The planner's problem with homogeneous users 
 
The planner seeks to maximize the utility of the individuals. As all individuals are 
identical, this amounts to maximizing the utility of a “representative agent”. With 
perfect knowledge of the preferences of the infrastructure users, he will simultaneously 
optimise the supply of services and cost recovery through the revenues generated by 
pricing. The constraint he faces is the total availability of resources. The planner cannot 
spend more on infrastructure than the total amount of consumption goods the 
individuals do not want to use for private consumption. He or she then faces the 
following budget constraint: 
 ( ) ( ) 0=Γ−− ηnccn  (3) 
 
To find out how much of the endowments should go into private consumption and 
how much should be used for infrastructure, the planner solves a constrained 
optimization problem. She or he maximizes individual utility under the budget 
constraint: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ηληηη nccnncULnc Γ−−+= ,,max,,  (4) 
 
That is, the planner determines the optimal level of consumption, the optimal number 
of users of the facility and the optimal number of trips. 
 
4. Optimal solutions for pricing and capacity 
 
First-order conditions for the optimal solution: 
 
0=−∂
∂=∂
∂ n
c
U
c
L λ , (5) 
 
which implies 
 
c
U
n ∂
∂= 1λ  (6) 
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λ  indicates what the social availability of one more unit of the consumption good 
means to the welfare of all users. 
 
0=∂
Γ∂−∂
∂+∂
∂=∂
∂ n
GG
UnUL ληη  (7) 
The first term on the right-hand side shows the increase in utility of having one more 
use of the infrastructure. The second term indicates the disutility of all the other 
members of society doing the same, with the consequence of increasing congestion. The 
sum of these effects should be equal to the marginal costs of all of the (equal) 
individuals taking the same decision, multiplied by the factor that transforms costs in 
terms of the consumption good into terms of utility. 
 
Dividing by the expression for λ  and n we obtain from (7): 
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The absolute value of (a) is identical to the Marginal Rate of Substitution between 
private consumption and use of the infrastructure facility. It indicates how much of 
private consumption individuals are prepared to give up to have one more unit of 
infrastructure use in equilibrium. It is equivalent to the willingness to pay for a unit of 
infrastructure use and is in a well-defined sense the "efficiency price". (b) is negative 
and indicates an individual's utility loss due to congestion if another individual increases 
the use of the facility by one unit: (-n) times this expression is then what the latter 
should pay to compensate all the other users for the increase in congestion. The first 
term on the right-hand side of (9) is the marginal cost of operating the facility due to the 
increase in infrastructure use by one unit. 
Marginal operation costs plus the compensations for the disutility of increased 
congestion add up to the efficiency price. 
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Figure 1: Marginal cost pricing with congestion. 
That this just covers the total costs of the facility can be seen from the planner's 
answer to the question of how many users should be admitted to the facility. Given that 
he knows already the optimal quantity of demand per user, this amounts to determining 
the capacity. 
 
Differentiating (4) with respect to n, we have 
 
( ) 0=∂
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Dividing by the expression for λ  according to equation (6) we obtain 
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Multiplying both sides of the equation by n leads to 
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Minus ( )ccn −  is equal toΓ . That is 
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The right-hand side of (13) shows the total payments by the users of the 
infrastructure. (c) is the total payment by all users for causing congestion, (d) is the total 
payment for the marginal operation costs of all users. The right-hand side of (13) is 
exactly equal to the efficiency price of using one more unit (trip, hour of driving), which 
is equal to the right-hand side of (9), times the total use of the infrastructure G. It also 
shows that if congestion is sufficiently strong, transport infrastructure can be offered 
like a private good. Dividing (13) by G, we have the optimality condition that the 
marginal congestion costs plus the marginal infrastructure costs add up to the average 
infrastructure costs, i.e. the costs per unit of service. This is illustrated in Figure 1, with 
the slope of the ray from the origin representing the average costs. As this ray is tangent 
to the social cost curve, it represents the social marginal costs as well. Without 
congestion (c) in (13) is negligible, and the optimality conditions will always be 
violated with the usual assumptions about the cost function of infrastructure. With 
constant marginal costs and fixed costs, average costs will be decreasing throughout the 
relevant levels of usage. 
The optimality conditions can be restored by fixed transfers to the infrastructure 
sector. These transfers are either financed by taxes or by fixed charges. In any case, they 
have to be unrelated to the use of the infrastructure as well as to the characteristics of 
the users so as not to violate the optimality conditions. It is this required independence 
that leads to distributional problems in the case of the heterogeneity of agents. 
 
5. User heterogeneity, optimality and perceptions of distributional justice 
 
To cast the problem of distribution effects and pricing in the simplest form, we 
assume that two groups exist that are still identical but for their endowment with initial 
income. We assume that the first group has n1 members, all equipped with an initial 
income of 1c , the second group has n2 members with an income of 2c . To avoid any 
discussion of the comparability of utilities, we assume that all individuals have the same 
utility function. 
 
The total use of the infrastructure has then to be redefined to 
 
2211 ηη nnG += , (14) 
 
and the cost function to 
 
1 1 2 2( )n nη ηΓ = Γ +  (15) 
 
The planner's problem is then changed to 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]22111111112211 ,,,,max ηηληη nnccnccnGcUGcUL +Γ−−+−++=  (16) 
 
By the same analytical steps as in the case of homogeneous users, we arrive at two 
optimality conditions, one for each group 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 31 (2005): 15-27 
 22
 
0
/
/
/
/
1
1
1
1 =∂
Γ∂−∂∂
∂∂+∂∂
∂∂
GcU
GUn
cU
U η  (17) 
 
and 
 
0
/
/
/
/
2
2
2
2 =∂
Γ∂−∂∂
∂∂+∂∂
∂∂
GcU
GUn
cU
U η  (18) 
 
The first term on the left-hand side of both equations indicates the willingness to pay 
of the user group members for an additional unit of infrastructure services. Despite the 
differences in income, these are equal because 
 
λ
1
// 2
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1 =∂∂=∂∂ cU
n
cU
n  (19) 
 
as follows from the optimal values for the consumption of the private good. 
That is, the optimal social organization of infrastructure provision implies the pricing 
of individual units of infrastructure use according to the social marginal costs of the 
services. If congestion is strong enough that the social marginal cost of infrastructure 
increases with an increasing number of users and/or an increasing number of kilometres 
travelled, the infrastructure is self-financing 
 
 
6. Principles of distributive fairness 
 
Notions of “fairness” are not, of course, universal. They refer to underlying principles 
which are more or less able to claim universal support. Fairness naturally, and following 
Aristotelian philosophy, entails the equal treatment of equals. If two persons have 
identical characteristics in all dimensions relevant to an allocation problem at hand, they 
should receive the same treatment, i.e. the same share of income, voting power or costs 
of a service which is commonly enjoyed. 
The unequal treatment of unequals is, in contrast, a vague concept, which is open to 
interpretation. That is, the difficulties with the notion of “unequal treatment of 
unequals” result from the heterogeneity of the population that the fair distribution of 
surplus or costs is designed for. Four different principles are central to the discussion 
 
(1) exogenous rights, 
(2) fitness, 
(3) compensation, 
(4) reward. 
 
These principles will be briefly discussed to argue that the potential conflict with the 
Pareto principle -- that allocations should be such that no reallocation of resources could 
improve the position of one party without worsening the position of another -- implies 
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that only the reward principle is important for the discussion of infrastructure pricing 
and distributive fairness. 
The notion of fairness concerning exogenous rights is independent of the consumption 
of the relevant resources or the responsibility of the consumers in their production. A 
paramount instance of exogenous rights is the fairness principle of equality in the 
allocation of certain basic rights such as political rights, the freedom of speech, etc. The 
right to vote, for example, is equal for all voters regardless of their desire to vote or the 
rationality of the voters. Equal exogenous rights postulate equality ex ante in the sense 
of an equal claim to resources, regardless of the way they affect our welfare and that of 
others. For the provision of infrastructure services, this would imply an equal (and free) 
access to infrastructure that is financed by a lump sum tax, regardless of the 
endowments of the user or differences in individual demand. 
The fitness principle postulates that resources must go to whoever potentially makes 
the best use of them. The fitness principle justifies an unequal allocation of resources, 
independently of needs, merit or rights. 
Both the exogenous rights and the fitness principle are in sharp contrast to the 
compensation principle. The compensation principle is based on the idea that certain 
differences in individual characteristics are involuntary, morally unjustified and affect 
the distribution of a higher order characteristic that is to be equalized. This justifies 
unequal shares of resources in order to compensate for the involuntary difference in the 
primary characteristics. The compensation principle aims at an equal degree of 
satisfaction of consumers' needs ex post. For the consumption of infrastructure services, 
equality according to the compensation principle would require an equal sacrifice in 
utility terms for all users of the transport system. The compensation principle is relevant 
to the discussion of the fairness of pricing rules only to the extent that fiscal 
redistribution mechanisms are unable to correct a socially undesirable distribution of 
incomes or abilities. The unequal distribution of characteristics which induce undesired 
inequalities of higher order characteristics should focus on the correction of the unequal 
distribution of primary characteristics. More specifically, if the income distribution of a 
society is perceived to be too unequal, the unequal income distribution should be 
corrected by fiscal measures and not the consequent unequal distribution of 
opportunities to travel. 
The most important principle of fairness for the discussion of infrastructure pricing 
roles and distributional fairness is the reward principle. According to the reward 
principle, individual characteristics are morally relevant when they are viewed as 
voluntary and consumers are held responsible for them. They justify unequal treatment. 
Due to the fact that individual demands do not lead to variations in total costs of 
infrastructure but might reduce the per capita costs for all consumers, the application of 
the reward principle is not straightforward. 
 
 
7. Distributional conflict of fixed fee and optimal pricing 
 
If infrastructure users are unequal, a distributional conflict might be introduced as a 
result of different demands by the users of the infrastructure. More specifically, the 
different interests of unequal users may manifest themselves in differences in the 
preferred pricing rule. Assume that the users have a choice between different pricing 
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rules to cover the full costs of infrastructure. A first option could be to postulate that the 
per-km user charges should cover the full costs of the infrastructure. The optimisation of 
the social planner, set out in section (2), would then have to be extended by a restriction 
that prices have to cover the costs of the infrastructure. Such an optimisation exercise 
would lead to a Ramsey price of p0. The consumers might be offered the choice of 
paying a price (p0 − t) which is lower by the amount t. The alternative expenditure 
functions would then be (cf. Willig 1978) 
 ( ) η00 *, pnpE = , and (20) 
 ( ) ( )ηγ tptnpE −+= 0*,  (21) 
 
The user will prefer the pricing rule that will imply the higher indirect utility, denoted 
by V. She or he would prefer a two-part tariff to a Ramsey price if 
 ( ) ( )cpVtctpV ,, 00 ≥−− γ  (22) 
 
For small t, starting from full cost prices, the consumer prefers a two-part tariff if 
 
( ) 0
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γηγ
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V
dp
V
dt
dV
t
 (23) 
 
As the marginal indirect utility with respect to real income is always positive, the 
preference for a two-part tariff follows from ( )γη −  being positive. The higher the 
equilibrium demand for infrastructure services, the more the user will prefer a two-part 
tariff. The smaller the equilibrium demand, the more they will prefer Ramsey pricing. 
To implement full cost pricing to satisfy the political demands of the low demand group 
would lead to an aggregate welfare loss. If marginal costs were zero, as assumed in 
Figure 2, the triangle BCD would represent the loss of consumer rent which would 
result from full cost pricing. 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 31 (2005): 15-27 
 25
 
 
Figure 2: Marginal vs. average cost pricing and consumer welfare. 
 
 
8. Solution of the distributional conflict 
 
The solution of the conflict between equity and efficiency proposed here relies on the 
well-known model of allocating the costs of a jointly used resource according to the 
cooperative game theory concept of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953, Shubik, 1962). 
In terms of the general principles stated in section (6), the solution concept rests almost 
entirely on the reward principle, posing the question of a fair level of contribution to the 
joint costs in order to deserve the service enjoyed in equilibrium. 
With marginal cost pricing, the cost allocation game is about access charges for 
different users whose demands add in different ways to the total costs of the 
infrastructure. This is a standard mechanism for joint fixed cost allocation mechanisms 
(Young, 1994; Sharkey, 1995). They have also been applied in transport economics, as 
a solution to charging in cases where there are only fixed costs and price inelastic 
demand (Littlechild and Thomson, 1977). The cost allocation method has even been 
proposed as a way to calculate full cost prices for infrastructure use (Doll, 2005). 
However, it has not been discussed as a solution to the distributional problem of two-
part tariffs. To introduce the idea of the solution concept, consider the following 
example. There are three classes of vehicles A, B and D requiring different 
infrastructure designs, leading to different fixed, annual stand-alone costs: 
 
60})({ =iC , for i = A, B, D  (24) 
p 
AC 
 p
B
C D
infrastructure use
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 ( ) ( ) 120== ADCABC  (25) 
 ( ) 60=BDC   (26) 
 ( ) 120=ABDC   (27) 
 
The capital C indicates fixed annual costs for the different coalitions, assuming 
technical efficiency. To compute a fair allocation, a generalised principle of 
marginalism is applied. Adding, for example, vehicle class B to A, or D to A, or both B 
and D to A leads to additional demands for the infrastructure, implying additional costs 
of 60. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 60=−=−=−= ACABDCACADCACABCAC  (28) 
 
The solution mechanism now orders the vehicle classes to randomly identify the 
expected additional fixed costs, for which the individual vehicle classes are responsible. 
For the coalition formation process B, A, D we obtain, for example, the following 
values xi, with i = A, B, D: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 60,60)(,60 =−==−=== ACABDCxBCABCxBCx DAB  (29) 
 
This process is repeated for all possible sequences to form the “coalition” of all 
vehicle classes. This leads to the following orderings and additional fixed costs: 
 
Ordering Class A Class B Class D 
ABD 60 60 0 
ADB 60 60 0 
BAD 60 60 0 
BDA 60 60 0 
DAB 0 60 60 
DBA 60 0 60 
Sharpley value 50 50 20 
 
That is, the fair allocation as defined by the Shapley value assigns the average of the 
marginal contributions to total costs in the process of the formation of the all-player 
coalition to the individual vehicle types. This model of a random formation of the all-
player coalition mimics, in a sense, the notion of the Rawlsian theory of justice that 
fairness considerations are based on the expectation that the individual might end up in 
a socially disadvantaged position. Furthermore, it has been shown by Harsanyi that the 
cost allocation solution presented above generalizes the two persons bargaining game of 
Nash to an arbitrary number of players. That is, the notion of fairness presented here 
does not depend on a \public interest" view of politics, where a benevolent dictator 
decides on the assignment of costs following a universally accepted principle of 
fairness. Rather, the solution concept can be interpreted as the anticipated outcome of a 
bargaining process between all parties involved. 
An often-raised counterargument against the Shapley value is the high level of 
information requirements, either for planners or bargaining partners. In the specific 
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context of infrastructure provision there is, however, a way of identifying types of 
consumers by vehicle types. In many countries, an approximate solution could be 
implemented by designing or re-designing a vehicle tax according to the presented cost 
allocation mechanism. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
The paper has discussed the conflict between efficient pricing and fairness. It has been 
shown that the conflict arises in cases where marginal congestion costs are too low to 
allow for coverage of full costs by marginal cost pricing. Conventional solutions to 
solve the distributional problem would entail efficiency losses. The paper proposes an 
allocation mechanism for the fixed costs that would resolve the conflict between 
efficiency and distributional equity. 
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